

# AUTOMATIZATION OF QWAC ISSUANCE

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# Plan

Challenges for automatization of QWACS  
issuance

Possible approach for automatization



# CHALLENGES FOR AUTOMATIZATION OF QWACS ISSUANCE



# Qualified Website Authentication Certificates

As defined in Regulation (EU) No 910/2014\* (eIDAS)

**Goal:** provide the identity of the legal / natural person behind a website

- Qualified certificate
- Content as in Annex IV (eIDAS)
- Issued by a qualified trust service provider (QTSP)
- Makes it possible to authenticate a website

# Qualified certificate

Identity verification (article 24.1a): “complete certainty” about identity for each certificate issuance


Revocation within 24h (article 24.3)

Provide revocation information (article 24.4):

- at least on a per certificate basis
- at any time and beyond the validity period of the certificate
- in an automated manner that is reliable, free of charge and efficient




# Identity verification (article 24.1a)





# Content as in Annex IV (eIDAS)





# Issued by qualified trust service provider (QTSP)

Audited at least every 24 month by a conformity assessment body (ETSI EN 319 403-1)

Qualified status delivered by **supervisory body of the member state** in which the QTSP is established

Qualification status published in national **trusted list** and referenced by EU list of trusted lists (eIDAS Dashboard)

Requirements for essential entities of **NIS 2** (Directive (EU) 2022/2555) and specific implementing act (CIR (EU) 2024/2690)

Recognized within EU as begin qualified



# Makes it possible to authenticate a website

Automatization

Aligned with IVC, OVC (BRG) or EVC (EVCG) requirements (1-QWAC)

Linked to a TSL certificate (2-QWAC) (ETSI TS 119 411-05)

Not needed to be recognized by browsers (QCP-w-gen in ETSI EN 319 411-2, for example for PSD2 as described in ETSI TS 119 495)



# Problem

How to combine automated issuance with high confidence in the identity at each issuance of the certificate?



# POSSIBLE APPROACH FOR AUTOMATIZATION




# Two documents

- [Automatisation de la gestion des certificats avec ACME | ANSSI \(French\) \(2025-01-24\)](#)
  - Recommendations for the issuance of certificates with ACME
  - Reduce risks introduced by larger exposure of the CA by adding an ACME server and increasing attack vector on the user side based on adding the ACME client
  - For French public authorities, also requirements for ACME client
- [FESA Position Paper on QWACs-final.pdf \(2024-09-24\)](#)
  - Forum of European Supervisory Authorities for trust service providers
  - Specific to QWACs
  - Formulation more general, with ACME only as example



# How to achieve high level of confidence in the identity?



# Main steps

- Step 1 – Initial certificate application (agree to ToR, select parameters)
- Step 2 – Initial verification process (verify attributes to be put into certificate, at least identity)
- Step 3 – Creation of external account (multifactor authentication to access to the account, fix list of domain names, create binding material)
- Step 4 – Creation of ACME account and linking to external account (bound to exactly one external account)
- Step 5 – Request certificates in automated manner



# Requirements on the external account

- Linked to at least one human operator
- Strong multifactor authentication for creation and any changes in the external account
- External account contains at least following parameters
  - Identity information and attributes to be put into the certificate
  - List of (sub-)domains for which certificates can be issued
  - Lifetime of eternal account
  - Associated ACME accounts
  - Binding material (KeyID and MAC key)
- Verification of identity / attributes conformant to eIDAS article 24.1a/1b
- Initial list of domain names include action of a human operator

# Requirements on ACME account + binding material

## ACME account

- Linked to exactly one external account
- May be possible to suspend an ACME account
- Shall allow renewal of key-pair

## Binding material

- Trusted cryptographic algorithms and key generator
- Created by CA
- Protect integrity and confidentiality of the binding material

# Automatization protocol

- Only accept requests for (sub-)domains that are listed in the external account
- Use multipoint validation
- Set limited number of failed domain validations
- Set limit for number of certificate requests per IP address
- Set limit for number of certificate requests per domain

# Certificate authority

- Dedicated intermediate CA for automatization
- Infrastructure (ACME server, registration service, database) at least logical separated from non automated services
- Allowed domain validation challenges: HTTP-01, DNS-01 or TLS-APLN-01
- Availability of a report of the different actions linked to the external account, like number of certificates created, revoked, currently valid, list of accepted domains
- Provide possibility of testing the automated solution



# What happens in case of compromise

- Compromise of external account
  - Check linked ACME account and renew them if needed
- Compromise of ACME account
  - Check generated certificates and revoke if needed
- Considers case of suspension



# French proposal – ACME client requirements

- Limit privileges of ACME client
- Protection of the binding material



**ANY QUESTIONS?**